. Spinning .

I’ve strayed in faithful reading of Boethius’ Consolation in that I have felt too personally in need of the lessons, therefore, thinking that my interest and my understanding of it was taken in a selfish way rather than for the wisdom it imparts of all mankind.  It was unfair, I felt, to judge and comprehend the reading with the evident taint of this personal desire to seek meaning.

However, in reading more of Philosophy’s reply to Boethius, I discovered that the presentation of the book in first person point of view may necessarily be a ploy for that very reason.  Boethius, as author, already knows both sides of the conversation, is indeed responsible for the voice of Philosophy herself.  He knows where it will lead–even as it leads him in his thinking.  This is not a diary or simple journal to himself; it is meant for furthering the understanding of man and theory.  Using this first person makes it a personal story, and yet, with our knowledge of POV, we understand that it brings the reader in.  Very often the first person POV–to me at any rate–is most annoying as it does not relate to my own character traits or place and state of being.  Reading "I" and disagreeing with it can unsettle the mind.

So then, I can more readily accept the reading if I, along with Boethius, are in this conversation with Philosophy together:

"First," Philosophy said, "will you let me test your present attitude with a few questions, so that I can decide on a way to cure you?"  (p. 14)

"Yes,"  Boethius and I reply.

After quietly listening to the complaints and woes of Boethius, Philosophy understands and focuses not on the situation in which Boethius finds himself, but to the degree of which he has allowed it to unsettle him:

"When I first saw you downcast and crying, I knew you were in misery and exile.  But without your story I would not have known how desperate your exile is."  (Consolation, p. 13)

And now the good stuff:

"You have not been driven out of your homeland; you have willfully wandered away.  Or, if you prefer to think that you have been driven into exile, you yourself have done the driving, since no one else could do it.  (…)  Surely you know the oldest law of your true city, that the citizen who has chosen to establish his home there has a sacred right not to be driven away.  the man who lives within the walls of that city need not fear banishment; but if he loses his desire to live there, he loses also the assurance of safety.  And so, I am not so much disturbed by this prison as by your attitude.  I do not need your library with its glass walls and ivory decoration, but I do need my place in your mind.  For there I have placed not books but that which gives value to books, the ideas which are found in my writings."  (p. 13)

Is Philosophy then saying that the knowledge and theories that are in the mind are what create the "place" in which to reside?  Is there a physicality to the mind, can it be relocated, moat and drawbridged, burned down, swept away by the floods of dissension?

And, is the place where one resides not the material made of stone and earth, but just within the confines of the mind; as books are physical, the ideas are not.

Has Boethius then created his own prison?

Boethius’ litany concludes with a poem:

"Harsh punishment, deserved by the criminal, afflicts the innocent.  Immoral scoundrels now occupy positions of power and unjustly trample the rights of good men.  Virtue, which ought to shine forth, is covered up and hides in darkness, while good men must suffer for the crimes of the wicked.  Perjury and deceit are not held blameworthy as long as they are covered by the color of lies.  When these scoundrels choose to use their power they can intimidate even powerful kings, because the masses fear them.

"O God, whoever You are who joins all things in perfect harmony, look down upon this miserable earth!  We men are no small part of your great work, yet we wallow here in the stormy sea of fortune.  Ruler of all things, calm the roiling waves and, as You rule the immense heavens, rule also the earth in stable concord."  (Consolation, p. 12)

Before I look into Philosophy’s reply, I look at Boethius’ ending statement.  After railing against the injustice of man-made laws, he questions why a God who has created all things, has not allowed a perfection of man that would be alike in the nature of all other creation, such as heaven and earth, man being just one of these creations.  It seems to question the wisdom or control of a supreme being in not creating an incorruptible human form.  Or, is it the questioning of the existence of a supreme being? 

As I head to court this morning, to fight on principle against greed and an illegal contract, I read of Boethius’ complaint as he sits in prison, justifying his position to Philosophy:

"I have often opposed the greed of Conigastus in his swindling of the poor.  I have condemned the crimes of Trigulla, Provost of the King’s house, both in their beginnings and after they had been committed.  At grave risk to my position I have protected the weak from the lies and avarice of cruel men in power.  No man ever corrupted my administration of justice.  I was as depressed as those who suffered the losses when I saw the wealth of our citizens dissipated either by private fraud or oppressive taxation.  At the time of the severe famine, when prices were set so exorbitantly high that the province of Campania seemed about to starve, I carried on the people’s fight against the Praetorian Perfect himself and, with the King’s approval, I won–the fixed prices were not enforced."  (Consolation, p.

Boethius is wondering why, when fighting on the side of good and justice, he is subject to that justice that is punishing him for his acts.  I cannot help but read this on a personal level right now, and while that is not my intent in this study, at the same time its immediate relevancy can be put to use.  Unfortunately, I am not at Philosophy’s answer, and the above is merely from a passage that sets the stage.  So I must either read real quickly, or suspect where this is heading.

Philosophy is the "study devoted to the systematic examination of basic concepts such as truth, existence, reality, causality, and freedom" (Encarta).  Truth then, both in the time of Boethius and in our own world such as it is, has never been synonymous with justice.  Common sense, a knowledge of right or wrong, is still subjective.  What will Philosophy bring in answer, what consolation will it offer in face of despair?  Will its "examination" come down to, "Yeah, life sucks, justice can be corrupted, the nature of man is greed; deal with it."

(more…)

I’m not sure how to take this, the lady Philosophy is speaking to Boethius:

"Philosophy has never thought it right to leave the innocent man alone on his journey.  Should I fear to face my accusers, as though their enmity were something new?  Do you suppose that this is the first time wisdom has been attacked and endangered by wicked men?  We fought against such rashness and folly long ago, even before the time of our disciple Plato.  And in Plato’s own time, his master Socrates, with my help, merited the victory of an unjust death.  Afterwards, the inept schools of Epicureans, Stoics and others, each seeking its own interests, tried to steal the inheritance of Socrates and to possess me (in spite of my protests and struggles), as though I were the spoils of their quarreling.  they tore this robe which I had woven with my own hands and, having ripped off some little pieces of it, went away supposing that they possessed me wholly.  Then, when traces of my garments were seen on some of them, they were rashly to be my friends, and they were therefore condemned by the error of the profane mob."  (Consolation, p. 5)

It would appear, and I can well understand, that the single branch of philosophy in its purest form as directly from Plato is what Boethius (as writer) is solely defending and advocating.  This is fine, so long as one agrees with the principles.  I was just a bit surprised, I suppose, that philosophy in all its schools of thought would not be represented despite their difference in theory.

This would lead me to contemplate the effect of era in which writings are read, as well as one’s personal philosophies regarding acceptance or openmindedness of thought.  But then again, how openminded am I being when I am immediately judging Boethius’ representation of Philosophy?

From Part I, Prose 2:

Seeing his desperate condition, Philosophy speaks more gently and promises to cure him.

"There is no danger.  You are suffering merely from lethargy, the common illness of deceived minds.  You have forgotten yourself a little, but you will quickly be yourself again when you recognize me.  To bring you to your senses, I shall quickly wipe the dark cloud of mortal things from your eyes."  (p. 4)

One would think that immersing oneself in the language and fancies of poetry would bring relief in times of woe, double the joy in good times.  And yet, what Philosophy is saying is that it is almost a form of fooling oneself at a time when one should look to truth and meaning in philosophy that can offer contentment. 

I would say that if this is what Philosophy  is saying, I would tend to agree.  Any writing or creative output that comes from emotion would indeed be as Aristotle claims, an imitation of life, and therefore, not helpful to oneself in understanding and accepting either joy or sorrow, but rather extends it in voice.  Think teenage angst and all those poems that pour out from our youth.  It is just emotion, a reaction to truth, not truth itself. 

Just received the book on this today, although I had ventured into it online but found such difference in the translations.

Of course I realize that there is no purpose to taking these readings and applying them to oneself personally, as they are meant rather to help one personally to understand human nature and mankind as a whole, but I found some immediate relevancy to exactly my own situation when I opened the mail today, just from the Introduction by Richard H. Green:

(…) but its general popularity and its pervasive influence in later literature derive from its humane consideration of profound human problems which have confronted all men everywhere.  The apparent power and success of injustice, fraud, and senseless cruelty against the apparent weakness and failure of reason and virtue is a dismaying part of the common experience of mankind.  (Consolation, p. vii)

When a family member has forgotten how to divide by three, seizes the lion’s share and wants to use estate funds for personal benefit, and to see lawyers and judges who are not outraged by blatant disregard for legal documents and a sense of fairness, and facing a probate court hearing next week, maybe Boethius will help me to understand it all.

So here I am, once again caught in the throes of dying artist, and Boethius seems here to speak to me and point out a direction; in short, be done with it and leap the cliff:

When she saw that the Muses of poetry were present by my couch giving words to my lamenting, she was stirred a while; her eyes flashed fiercely, and said she, ‘ Who has suffered these seducing mummers to approach this sick man? Never do they support those in sorrow by any healing remedies, but rather do ever foster the sorrow by poisonous sweets. These are they who stifle the fruit-bearing harvest of reason with the barren briars of the passions: they free not the minds of men from disease, but accustom them thereto. I would think it less grievous if your allurements drew away from me some uninitiated man, as happens in the vulgar herd. In such an one my labours would be naught harmed, but this man has been nourished in the lore of Eleatics and Academics; and to him have ye reached? Away with you, Sirens, seductive unto destruction! leave him to my Muses to be cared for and to be healed.’  (Consolation, Part I)

Is poetic writing then a threat to intellect and deeper meaning rather than the reverse as is believed?  A danger to one who "has been nourished in the lore of Eleatics and Academics" and best left instead to those within "the vulgar herd"? 

The narrator speaks of death, and how writing that once brought pleasure brings pain.  Is that the time to seek out philosophy instead, the timeliness of importance in one’s life and the importance of timeliness?

Possibly not the best time to be reading this, but then, if time is short, it need be known.